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PREVENTING RADICALIZATION IN EUROPEAN CITIES: AN URBAN GEOPOLITICAL 
QUESTION  
 




With the intensification of attacks in European cities since 2014, preventing radicalization has become 
the main security strategy for fighting ‘terrorism’ in Europe and beyond. While the concern with 
radicalization in security policy was due to a realization that European cities are not just the target of 
but also increasingly the ‘breeding ground’ of terrorism, less attention has been paid to how 
radicalization prevention has changed the relations between European cities and war. Debates in critical 
security studies have remained a-spatial for the most part, focused on either the national or international 
scales, while the question of radicalization has not yet become a topic of scrutiny in the literature on 
urban geopolitics. Addressing this lacuna, I engage with the policy debates at the EU, urban, and 
regional levels as well as the role of the European Forum for Urban Security that eventually led to the 
first EU Mayors’ conference on terrorism and radicalization in Brussels in March 2018. The core 
observation here is that, rather than another form of national security, radicalization prevention is an 
extension of counterinsurgency in European cities. This extension of the liberal way of war inside 
Europe is also accompanied by an increasing focus on urban geopolitics of danger, one that is the 
relational outcome of the assumed ungovernability of the Other at the urban and international scales 
and which blurs spaces of liberal peace and war. These developments point to the gradual incorporation 




On March 8, 2018, the European Commission (EC) and the Committee of Regions (CR) jointly held the 
first European Union (EU) Mayors’ conference on terrorism behind closed doors in Brussels.1 The 
conference, Building Urban Defences Against Terrorism, marked the first convergence of multi-scalar 
networks of European politicians, policymakers, and urban experts discussing radicalization prevention 
at the EU level. European mayors2 and the EU parliamentary members3 came together with members of 
two major EU think tanks, the Radicalization Awareness Network (RAN) and the European Forum for 
Urban Security (Efus), to examine four topics: “the role of cities in the fight against terrorism”, “lessons 
learned from recent attacks”, “security by design”, and “cities against radicalization” (EC & CR, 2018). 
The Brussels conference marked the European Commission’s (2018b, p. 2) official commitment to 
                                                     
1 Only the opening and closing remarks were broadcasted for journalists. 
2 These included the mayors of Nice, Manchester, Berlin, London, Hamburg, Chambon-Feugerolles, Stockholm, 
Mechelen, Sintra, Barcelona, Brussels, and Marseille. 
3 These included members of the European Parliament, the Committee of the Regions, the Security Union 




recognize urban authorities as major actors in fighting radicalization, to facilitate building policy 
networks, and to provide funding, with an immediate targeted funding of €220 million for research on 
transnational projects, support for cities, and innovative security projects. What does the Brussels 
conference reveal about relations between cities and war in continental Europe?  
 
With the recent intensification of attacks in European cities since 2014, radicalization – albeit vaguely 
defined – has become the top security issue in Europe and beyond, to the point of becoming a pillar of 
counterterrorism worldwide (Kundnani & Hayes, 2018). For the European Commission (2018a), 
radicalization is “a complex phenomenon of people embracing radical ideology that could lead to the 
commitment of terrorist attack”. Prevention, in turn, has become the best solution to combat this 
“complex phenomenon”. Scholars have criticized this preventive turn in national security policies for 
racializing Arab and Muslim populations as the internal enemy in Europe (Kundnani, 2012; Fadil et al., 
2019) and, particularly in the UK, they have condemned the resultant securitization of social policy 
(Ragazzi, 2017; Miah, 2017; Heath-Kelly, 2016). For the most part, however, these studies have 
remained a-spatial, focusing on either the national or international levels. Less attention has been paid 
to the urban dimensions of radicalization prevention, how these have changed relations between 
European cities and war, and what this means for security politics in the heartland of liberal democracy. 
Curiously, radicalization (prevention) has not yet become a topic of scrutiny in the sub-field of urban 
geopolitics, which has as one of its concerns the spatial dimensions of war in cities.  
 
Taking the first EU Mayors’ conference on radicalization as an entry point, the core observation of this 
article is that urban geopolitical imaginaries of danger are integral to threat perceptions in 
radicalization prevention, and thus a radical critique of radicalization prevention requires paying 
attention to the urban geopolitics of the liberal way of war in European cities. Theoretically, I am 
influenced by the insights of Henri Lefebvre on the politics of space, Michel Foucault on war, and 
Himani Bannerji on ideology. Empirically, I engage with developments that eventually led to the 2018 
EU Mayors’ conference, including main policy debates among the EU institutions and regional and 
urban authorities as well as the important role of Efus in making these debates sensible. While critics 
have paid attention to knowledge-production networks such as RAN (Kundnani & Hayes, 2018, pp. 20–
7) and Community Policing and the Prevention of Radicalization (CoPPRa) (de Goede & Simon, 2013), 
Efus has not come under any scrutiny to date.  
 
My main argument is that the shift from counterterrorism to radicalization prevention in Europe has 
changed relations between European cities and warfare. Radicalization prevention re-articulates and re-
territorializes counterinsurgency in European cities. This extension of the liberal way of war inside 
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Europe is also accompanied by an increasing focus on the urban geopolitics of danger, a focus that is the 
relational outcome of the assumed ungovernability of the Other at the urban and international scales 
and which blurs the spaces of liberal peace and war. European cities are no longer perceived as solely the 
victims of terrorism organized from outside and so in need of being secured through urban design and 
maximized security operations (see Coaffee et al., 2008); “[t]he majority of terrorist suspects involved in 
recent attacks in Europe,” reads the opening lines of the EU Mayors’ conference communiqué, “were 
born and raised in EU Member States, but were radicalised and turned against their fellow citizens” (EC 
& CR, 2018, p. 2). The focus on ‘home-grown radicalization’ has shifted attention to the ‘breeding 
grounds’ of terrorism, that is, as the spaces and agents of war in European cities. The metaphor of a 
‘breeding ground,’ which was hitherto deployed by military strategists to describe ‘failed’ states in the 
Global South, has become a reference code for ‘immigrant neighbourhoods’ such a Molenbeek and 
Schaerbeek in Brussels.  
 
In its emphasis on understanding radicalization prevention as the extension of liberal way of war in 
European cities, the paper contributes to debates on warfare and cities in urban geopolitics. I take up the 
recent calls in urban geopolitical debates to go beyond the binary differentiation between peaceful cities 
and cities in recognized war zones (see Rokem et al., 2017) and highlight the importance of engaging 
with the productive dimension of war in spaces of liberal peace. The paper also contributes to debates on 
radicalization prevention in Critical Security Studies by going beyond a sole focus on biopolitics and 
securitization. I argue that radicalization prevention strategies increasingly mediate and are mediated 
by the re-territorialization and re-articulation of the urban and geopolitical imaginaries of danger in the 
unevenly developed and racially segregated European cities. 
 
In what follows, I begin by addressing why it is important to take seriously the naming of ‘immigrant 
neighbourhoods’ as the ‘breeding grounds’ of radicalization. A critical engagement with the politics of 
such naming requires us to go beyond the liberal ideology of civil peace. I then situate radicalization 
prevention in relation to the liberal way of war, showing its ideological and strategic debt to 
counterinsurgency practices, particularly focusing on the concept of ‘holistic approach’. Having its roots 
in liberal warfare, the policy focus on ‘holistic approach’ has brought a development-oriented focus in 
prevention and has facilitated the entry of a whole array of experts, including urban experts and 
authorities in radicalization prevention. The third section focuses on the role of Efus as the major urban 
expert think tank in current urban-focused debates on radicalization prevention and in the EU Mayors’ 
conference. I map the Forum’s policy activism and its link to urban policy for the French banlieues, 
designed to combat the latter’s assumed ungovernability. I also take the recent urban policy 
developments in Brussels as an example of the extension of these debates beyond the corridors of the 
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EU. In the last section, I situate the current attention to the ‘breeding grounds’ in relation to the 
ideological parallels in the representations of ‘immigrant neighbourhoods’ and ‘failed’ state as the ‘safe 
heavens’ of terrorism. Taken together, these developments, I suggest, alert us to the ways that 
radicalization prevention is strengthening the convergence of security politics and urban governance 
and how in doing so there lies the danger of severely limiting democratic rights and accountability in 
today’s increasingly demographically diverse European cities.  
 
RADICALIZATION AND ITS ‘BREEDING GROUNDS’  
 
In tandem with the sequence of attacks in European cities since 2014, preventing radicalization and 
safeguarding ‘European values’ have become top security issues in Europe. Both are major priorities in 
The European Agenda on Security: 2015–2020 (EC, 2015, pp. 12–6) and the latest EU foreign and security 
policy, A Stronger Europe (EU, 2016, p. 4). The EU has revised its radicalization prevention strategy 
(Council of the European Union [Council], 2017) and released its first action plan on urban security, the 
Action Plan to Support the Protection of Public Spaces (EC, 2017). At the national scale, by early 2018 22 
EU member states had implemented radicalization prevention policies (Migration and Home Affairs, 
2018). At the regional and local scales, urban authorities and experts have become vocal forces in 
security politics around radicalization. A growing number of European mayors have gathered and 
signed declarations on preventing radicalization in four major summits in Aarhus (2015), Rotterdam 
(2016), Nice (2017), and Barcelona (2017). In addition, there is an ever-growing web of think tanks and 
networks producing knowledge on radicalization (prevention), many of which were founded by and 
almost all of which are financially supported by the EU.4 
 
As a security concept, radicalization was first coined by the Dutch security services in 2001. Besides its 
link to ‘violent extremism’, the concept from the beginning was used in relation to the racialized urban 
conditions in Europe, particularly the questions of segregation and integration of post-colonial5 
migrants (Fadil et al., 2019). With the 2003–2004 insurgencies against Western occupation of Iraq and 
Afghanistan and their consequences in Europe – the Madrid bombing in March 2004, the murder of 
Theo Van Gogh in Amsterdam in November 2004, and then the London bombing in July 2005 – 
security officials gradually shifted their counterterrorism strategies towards preventing radicalization 
                                                     
4 These include: European Network of Experts on Radicalization, Radicalization Awareness Network, Institute for 
Strategic Dialogue, European Forum for Urban Security, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, 
European Foundation for Democracy, Civil Society Empowerment Programme, Strong Cities Network, and 
Network for National Prevent Policy Makers. 
5 My use of post-colonial is a temporal reference to the period after the shattering of European colonialism. 
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inside Europe. State security forces have justified the preventative targeting of those assumed to be ‘at-
risk’ of becoming ‘terrorists’ in the name of safeguarding ‘European values’, social cohesion, and peace.  
 
A growing scholarship in Critical Security Studies has since questioned this appeal to safeguarding 
values. Scholars have underlined how, in echoing the Islam-versus-the-West narrative of the War on 
Terror (Mamdani, 2004), preventive strategies systematically racialize Muslim populations as the 
internal enemy in Europe. Despite different histories of nation-building and non-European migration as 
well as the different demographics of those assumed to be Muslim or who identify as Muslim, one can 
see a similar racializing of the internal enemy as ‘the Muslim’ from the UK (Kundnani, 2009) and France 
(Mondon & Winter, 2017) to Belgium and the Netherlands (Fadil et al., 2019) and on to Denmark 
(Anderson & Moe, 2015) and Sweden (Hörnqvist & Flyghed, 2012). Scholars have also criticized, 
particularly in the UK, how the appeal to safeguarding has resulted in state co-optation of social policy 
for targeting the ‘at-risk’ through the increasing securitization of education (Miah, 2017), public health 
(Heath-Kelly, 2016), and social services (Ragazzi, 2017). More recently, others have pointed out to some 
aspects of the geographical focus and the global spread of radicalization prevention (Heath-Kelly, 2017; 
Kundnani & Hayes, 2018).  
 
Less attention has been paid to how radicalization prevention has changed relations between European 
cities and war and what this means for security politics and governance in the heartland of liberal 
democracy. This is important not least because since the 2015 Paris attacks, alongside the racialized 
figure of ‘the Muslim’ as the internal enemy, there has been an undeniable attention to ‘immigrant 
neighbourhoods’ – areas of deprivation populated by majority low-income, non-White residents. 
Parisian banlieues such as Gennevilliers and Saint-Denis and Brussels’ deprived quartiers such as 
Schaerbeek and Molenbeek, neighbourhoods where the attackers had resided and been captured or from 
where they left for Syria, were quickly represented as the ‘breeding grounds’ of radicalization in the 
media. Molenbeek, for example, suddenly was given the nicknames of “The Islamic State of Molenbeek”, 
“Europe’s jihadi capital”, and “Europe’s jihadi heaven.” These forms of naming are not simply a fleeting 
matter of sensational journalism. After all, names and naming in politics, as Himani Bannerji (2000) 
explains,  
are more than just words, they are ideological concepts. They imply intentions and political and 
organizational practices … To say this is to say explicitly that discourse is more than a 
linguistic manoeuvre. It is a matter of putting in words, mediating and organizing social 
relations of ruling, of meanings organized through power. (p. 41) 
 
Ideology, for Bannerji, is “the process of creating a dehistoricized and dehistoricizing body of content – 
of representations of reality” that simultaneously also erases and distorts reality (2011, p. 236). This 
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process of creating, erasing, and distorting reality is essential to relations of ruling. The concept of 
‘breeding ground’ has colonial and geopolitical connotations. It carries in itself imaginaries of animality, 
contagion, and danger, historically associated with the assumed ‘uncivilized’ nature of colonies. 
‘Breeding ground’ is also a spatial and geopolitical metaphor of war. Military strategists and 
geopoliticians had hitherto deployed the concept to describe the ‘failed’ states and ‘ungoverned spaces’ of 
the War on Terror as so-called ‘safe heavens’ for producing and recruiting terrorists to attack the West 
(see Hehir, 2007; Call, 2008). The current transplantation of the concept so as to apply to ‘immigrant 
neighbourhoods’ of European cities should alert us to the urban, geopolitical, and neocolonial6 
dimensions of the latest geographical imaginaries of war in Europe. While since 9/11 counterterrorism 
measures have been part of urban security policies, the concepts of ‘home-grown radicalization’ and 
‘breeding ground’ have changed the relations between Western cities and war. In the media and policy 
discourses, Western cities are no longer solely the victims of terrorism organized from outside. Rather, 
we are told, particular geographies of European cities – ‘immigrant neighbourhoods’ – are now ‘safe 
havens’ for harbouring and recruiting those ‘at-risk’ of terrorism. In his opening remarks to the 2018 
EU Mayors’ conference, Dimitris Avramopoulos (2018), the EU Commissioner for Migration, Home 
Affairs and Citizenship, highlighted the need to “neutralize the breeding grounds in our cities”.  
 
Cities have never been a neutral canvas for making war and politics. As Henri Lefebvre (1991) argued a 
half century ago, space is not a tabula rasa. Space is a social product; it is in fact the ultimate locus and 
medium of struggle. “There is a politics of space,” Lefebvre (2009, pp. 167–85) emphasized, “because 
space is political”, because the production and destruction of urban space have historically been key 
political stakes for domination and the survival of imperialist capitalism. Since the 1990s, the politics of 
space in warfare have directed scholars in the sub-field of urban geopolitics to examine the complex 
ways that the diverse and multi-scalar political geographies of war play out in and through urban 
spaces. The upshot of this literature is that the spatial dimension of war and the political dimension of 
space have been integral to warfare. From the geographical imaginaries of danger to make war 
(Gregory 2004, 2016) and the deliberate destruction of cities to win war (Coward, 2008) to the 
increasing urbanization of warfare (Graham, 2004, 2010) and the use of urban design as a security 
apparatus (Coaffee et al., 2008) and on to the territorial dimension of the War on Terror and the vertical 
geometrics of urban asymmetric conflicts (Elden, 2009, 2013), scholars have directed us to the integral 
relations between space, war, and ideology.  
 
                                                     
6 By neocolonial, I refer to the re-composed continuation of colonial and imperial relations of domination and 
exploitation after official decolonization in the early second half of the twentieth century. 
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Surprisingly, radicalization prevention has not yet become a topic of scrutiny in urban geopolitics. This 
is partly due to the conception of war and the temporal and geographical emphasis in this relatively 
young literature. The dominant focus on spectacular geographies of war (in the former Yugoslavia, 
Palestine, Iraq, Afghanistan) has resulted in a representation of war as solely being about the project of 
kinetic force into non-Western political geographies. When war ‘comes home’ to the West, cities in turn 
are perceived solely as the victims and not the agents of war (as in Coaffee et al., 2008; Graham, 2010). 
In their recent intervention, Jonathan Rokem and Sara Fregonese (Rokem et al., 2017, p. 254) have 
called for pushing the boundaries of debate in urban geopolitics by “challenge[ing] the canonical 
differentiation between urban phenomena of socio-economic spatial segregation, socio-political division, 
and of militarized urban conflict, and – ultimately – the very distinction between conflict cities and more 
peaceful ones”. Recent developments in the EU radicalization prevention debates, I suggest, push us to 
challenge such differentiation as they direct us to take into consideration the spatiality of the kinetic 
dimension of war and the geopolitical struggles and international affairs (see, Elden, 2009; Agnew & 
Corbridge, 1995), as well as that of urban politics. This is also the point that has not yet gained due 
attention in the current critical literature on radicalization prevention; that is, the need to go beyond the 
liberal ideology of civil peace, which represents liberal society (Europe/the West) as the space of peace 
produced through cessation of war and war as ‘the state of nature’ that is always already located outside 
of the territoriality of liberal society. A radical critique of radicalization prevention requires situating its 
ideology and practice in relation to what Dillion and Reid (2009) have called the liberal way of war. 
 
THE LIBERAL WAY OF WAR AND RADICALIZATION PREVENTION  
 
“If we look beneath peace, order, wealth, and authority … will we hear and discover a sort of primitive 
and permanent war?” asked Michel Foucault in his 1975–76 lectures under the title Society Must Be 
Defended (2003). In proposing an inversion of Clausewitz’s dictum that ‘war is the continuation of 
politics by other means’, Foucault attempted to approach war as a social relation and in doing so 
suggested how we might consider war as the matrix for techniques of domination in liberal society. 
“The role of political power,” he wrote, “is perpetually to use a sort of silent war to reinscribe that 
relationship of force” in order to neutralize the disequilibrium revealed by war (Foucault, 2003, p. 15). 
The dualist separation of peace and war owes its commonsense status to liberal law, which in 
sanctioning such a separation (at the international and national scales) aimed to legitimatize the violence 
of capitalism and modern colonialism (Neocleous, 2014, pp. 17–36). Foucault’s unfinished project has 
inspired scholars to examine the ways that strategies of war may function in specific ways on the terrain 
of peace, entailing both destructive and productive dimensions. Counterinsurgency, for example, is one 




Ideologically and strategically, radicalization prevention re-articulates counterinsurgency in the 
‘breeding grounds’ of European cities. As Rizwan Sabir (2017) has shown, the UK Prevent surveillance 
strategy of and propaganda against ‘the Muslim’ are extensions of the British counterinsurgency 
strategies used in Northern Ireland and Afghanistan. This link transcends particular components of 
radicalization prevention and the case of the UK Prevent. It was not accidental that radicalization 
prevention emerged in the conjuncture in which counterinsurgency also made a comeback in warfare 
strategies. In order to win war, the re-emergence of counterinsurgency aimed to moderate violence by 
bringing a strategic shift towards an increasing ‘civilianization’ of warfare (Bell, 2011), anchored in the 
intertwined ways of liberal rule and war where the liberal governing of life is itself part of the war effort 
(Dillon & Reid, 2009). The return of counterinsurgency reaffirmed the increasing dependence of the 
liberal way of war on strengthening the historical nexus of development and security, a deepening that 
capitalizes on the moderation of violence in order to sustain domination by merging the social 
reconstruction and reform of the enemy societies in order to nullify threats and crush resistance 
(Duffield, 2001, 2007; Bell, 2011; Wiezman, 2011).  
 
In a manner similar to counterinsurgency doctrine, the central logic of radicalization prevention is that 
coercive power and its kinetic force cannot win the war against terrorism on its own. Rather, so we are 
told, in the ‘battle of ideas’ between Islamist extremism and Western liberal democracy there is also a 
need to ‘win hearts and minds’ so as to moderate violence. As such, the policy focus on radicalization 
prevention signalled a move away from security politics with a sole focus on fighting formal 
organizations designated as ‘terrorist’ towards an emphasis on preventing ‘extremist’ mind-sets in ‘at-
risk’ subjects (see Kundnani & Hayes, 2018; EC, 2018a). Anchored on the nexus of security and 
development, this preventive turn in security and war politics in Europe emphasizes the promotion of 
good governance, democracy, education, and economic prosperity through assistance programmes – not 
in opposition to coercive strategies of counterterrorism, but rather as complementary components to 
them (see Barzegar et al., 2016). The inclusion of social policy and the attention to the urban question in 
radicalization prevention strategies are in relation to this deepening nexus of security and development 
in European cities. The logic here is legitimized by appealing to a ‘holistic approach’ in policy 
discourses. 
 
“The prevention of radicalization in our cities,” reads the 2018 EU Mayors’ communiqué (EC & CR, 
2018), “is an issue of outmost urgency, and requires a holistic approach based on all relevant policies”. 
References to a conceptual label such as “holistic approach”, “comprehensive approach”, “integrated 
approach”, “whole of society”, “whole of city”, and “multi-agency approach” have formed one major pillar 
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of preventive debates since 2015. One encounters them in the EU debates (EC, 2015, pp. 4, 15; EU, 
2016, pp. 4, 9–10; Council, 2017, p. 4; The Congress, 2016a, p. 9), the European mayors’ declarations 
(The Congress, 2015, 2016b, 2017; Efus & EUROMED, 2017), and in policy proposals made by think 
tanks (RAN, 2018; EUKN, 2016). What these terms mean is that the fight against radicalization, as the 
Guidelines for the EU Strategy for Combating Radicalization (Council, 2017) states, needs “to make use of 
all relevant policy areas and instruments, including criminal justice, education, social inclusion, 
citizenship and European values, etc.” (p. 4). As a policy concept, the history of the ‘holistic approach’ 
goes back to the late twentieth century. The concept had already been put into practice under (at times 
similar) names such as “comprehensive approach”, “whole of government”, “unity of effort”, “joint-up 
government”, and “integrated mission” in a whole array of state warfare and imperialist interventions in 
‘ungoverned spaces’ and ‘failed’ states of the Global South – from peace operations to international 
development and humanitarian interventions and on to counterinsurgency and urban warfare (see 
Patrick & Brown, 2007; Friis, 2010; Bell, 2011). In international relations, the ideological premise of the 
‘comprehensive approach’ is rooted in the geographical imaginaries of underdevelopment, poverty, and 
inadequate governance in ‘fragile’ states posited as threats to global peace and security (Bell, 2011, p. 
325).  
 
A parallel ideology is at play in radicalization prevention today, and as we will see in the last section, 
this ideology is central to the rendering of ‘immigrant neighbourhoods’ as the ‘breeding grounds’ of 
radicalization. Proponents of prevention argue that a ‘holistic approach’ is essential for addressing the 
“root causes” of radicalization in Europe. Under the banner of the “root causes”, in turn, they point to 
poverty, socio-economic exclusion, excessive (Islamic) religiosity, and cultural segregation as threats to 
‘European values’ and peace in European cities (EC, 2015, pp. 12–6; EU, 2016, p. 21; Parliamentary 
Assembly of the Council of Europe [PACE], 2015, p. 3, 5, 2016a, pp. 1, 3–4, 2016b, pp. 1, 3; The 
Congress, 2016a, p. 9; Council, 2017, pp. 2, 4). Echoing the debates on ‘new wars’ (Kaldor, 1999), the 
ideological appeal of ‘holistic approach’ is that it conveniently turns symptoms of urban uneven 
development, racialization, segregation, and exploitation into causes of radicalization. In the meantime, 
the emphasis on a ‘holistic approach’ has opened up space for a diversity of experts (psychiatrists, 
psychologists, social workers, etc.) to participate in the knowledge production industry around 
radicalization (see RAN, 2018) and in the process has facilitated the mobilization of development-
oriented programmes as part of radicalization prevention (see Briscoe & van Ginkel, 2013). Seen from 
this perspective, more than co-opting social policy by securitizing it, radicalization prevention re-
articulates and re-territorializes the forms of social intervention that have long been part of the liberal 




The ‘holistic approach’ has also paved the way for the current emphasis on the specifically urban 
conditions (such as racial segregation, concentration of non-White poverty, unemployment, etc.) in 
prevention debates (EC, 2017, pp. 7–8; Council, 2017, p. 4; PACE, 2016b, p. 3; The Congress, 2016a, p. 
9). The EU’s first urban security policy in 2017, the series of four European mayors’ summits on 
radicalization between 2015 and 2017, the formation of urban knowledge networks such as the Strong 
Cities Network (2015), Nordic Safe Cities (2016), and the Alliance of European Cities Against Violent 
Extremism (2017), along with the first EU mayors’ conference in March 2018, all capture the current 
heightened attention to the specifically urban dimensions of radicalization prevention. In the Action 
Plan, for example, the European Commission (2017, pp. 3–4), underlines the need to link radicalization 
prevention to the 2016 Urban Agenda for the EU and the use of urban planning and design. In her closing 
remarks to the EU Mayors’ conference, Corina Cretu, the EU Commissioner for Regional Policy, 
encouraged mayors to make use of the European Development Fund and the Urban Innovative Actions 
Fund for preventing radicalization.7 Herein, the urban politics of ungovernability has played a crucial 
role.  
 
THE URBAN POLITICS OF RADICALIZATION PREVENTION: THE EUROPEAN FORUM 
FOR URBAN SECURITY 
 
The production of ungovernability, its spaces and figures, is integral to relations of ruling and forms of 
state intervention (Marei et al., 2018). The historical production of ‘immigrant neighbourhoods’ as 
supposedly ungovernable spaces of European cities is a key ideological force in the recent prominence of 
the urban question in radicalization prevention. Since 2014, the media has played an important role in 
normalizing a representation of ‘immigrant neighbourhoods’ as the ‘no-go zones’ and ‘breeding grounds’ 
of radicalization (see Yildiz, 2014; Ladevèze, 2015; Destexhe, 2016; Kroet, 2017). As we will see in the 
next section, this sudden fixated hysteria around ‘breeding grounds’ is the relational outcome of the 
convergence of the representations of ‘failed’ states in European cities and the already existing state and 
media discourses on ‘immigrant neighbourhoods‘ as ‘ungovernable’ urban spaces. The reaction of the 
former French Prime Minister Manuel Valls to the January 2015 attacks in Paris is yet another example 
of how politicians have reaffirmed this systematic production and normalization of urban 
ungovernability. “A territorial, social, ethnic apartheid has spread across our country”, Valls explained 
in reference to the French banlieues (de la Baume, 2015). I will come back to the geopolitics of the 
production of this form of urban ungovernability. First, I want to focus on the role of experts in urban 
crime prevention and urban policy in rationalizing such ideological links in the current policy debates.  
                                                     




The production of expert knowledge has been integral to dehistoricizing the ideological representations 
of space (Lefebvre, 1991). Urban policy does not simply act on space as a thing. Expert knowledge on 
urban issues, as Mustafa Dikeç (2007) has argued, is “guided by particular ways of imagining space, and 
different ways of imagining space have different implications for the constitution of perceived problems 
and proposed solutions” (p. 171). In the current EU debates, the Paris-based European Forum for Urban 
Security (Efus) has played an influential role in rationalizing the focus on cities through knowledge 
production and its lobbying powers at the European Council and the European Congress of Local and 
Regional Authorities (The Congress). The case of Efus is important for three reasons: First, the Forum 
was a major player in shaping the debates on the role of cities in radicalization prevention policy 
discourse and in the 2018 EU Mayors’ conference. Second, the history of the Forum’s emergence directs 
us to the long history of making sensible the ‘ungovernability’ of deprived, majority non-White 
neighbourhoods, while its current activities highlight the increasing role of urban experts in the liberal 
way of war in such neighbourhoods. Third, the gradually growing expert authority of Efus and the 
increasing level of secrecy in its activities should warn us about the undemocratic aspects and pitfalls of 
the privatization of policymaking.  
 
Founded in 1987 as a private non-profit research organization under the auspices of the Council of 
Europe, Efus was formerly known as the European Forum for Urban Safety and has since had 
consultative status to the Council of Europe, the European Parliament, and the European Commission 
in the area of urban crime prevention (delinquency, riots, youth violence, gangs, and drugs) (Calfa, 2007, 
p. 2). In the aftermath of the 2005 London bombings, Efus undertook its first project, Cities Against 
Terrorism (2006–2007). The project, funded by the European Commission, looked into the then newly 
formed UK Prevent for training local representatives in confronting terrorism (Efus, 2007). With the 
name change in 2011, the Forum’s activity around urban security beyond crime prevention follows the 
EU’s focus on radicalization and terrorism in European cities. The next round of the Forum’s activities, 
this time with an explicit focus on radicalization, followed the attack on the Jewish Museum of Brussels 
executed by a non-White French citizen in May 2014. In the aftermath of the 2015 Paris attacks, 
Giulherme Pinto (2015), then the president of Efus, was quick to declare that “The police and juridical 
reply of the States will only be effective if it is reinforced by that of the cities in the fields of prevention 
and integration” – a mission that the Forum has since taken seriously. 
 
Focusing on prevention, advocating for the role of urban authorities at the national and EU levels, and 
committing to area-based intervention in ‘problem’ localities are among the major themes of the 
Forum’s activities around crime and radicalization prevention (see Efus, 2014, 2017). Along these lines, 
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Efus has taken up an increasing number of EU-funded initiatives such as Local Institutions Against 
Violent Extremism (LIAISE) I and II (2014–2016 and 2016–2018 respectively); BOUNCE, which seeks 
to strengthen the resilience of ‘at-risk’ youth to extremism (since 2016); PRACTICES, which advocates 
partnership against violent radicalization in and among cities (2017–2020); PREPARE, which looks at 
the prevention of radicalization in prisons (2017–2019); Local Voices, which helps local authorities train 
credible local voices embedded in communities (2017–2019); PRoTECT, which focuses on public 
resilience to terrorism through new technologies (2018–2020); LOUD, which mobilizes local young 
leaders for inclusion initiatives (2019–2020); and BRIDGE, which is about building resilience to reduce 
polarization and growing extremism (2019–2020) (see Efus, 2019). Since 2015, Efus has also acted as an 
expert in the EU’s main think tank on radicalization, RAN.  
 
Efus has been the major force in organizing the series of summits of Euro-Mediterranean mayors on 
radicalization prevention and played an important role in crafting the four declarations that came out of 
these summits: The Aarhus Declaration (The Congress, 2015), The Rotterdam Declaration (The 
Congress, 2016b), The Nice Declaration (Efus & EUROMED, 2017), and the Barcelona Declaration 
(The Congress, 2017). Emphasizing prevention alongside repression and the role of cities and urban 
authorities as well as the use of integrated approaches are among the common themes of the four 
declarations. The first summit, The Aarhus Summit in November 2015, which coincidently took place in 
the aftermath of the second Paris attack, was a gathering of only the city members of Efus. In his 
opening speech, Jean-Claude Frécon (2015), president of The Congress, strongly portrayed the attacks 
as a war on the so-called ‘European way of life’, on the assumedly authentic neighbourhoods of 
European cities:  
 
This time, the people targeted by the terrorists were the younger generation. The generation 
who one can find sitting on café terraces in the evenings, who eat at restaurants, who go to 
concert halls, and who do this in mixed neighbourhoods, where cultures mix, intermingle and 
intermarry. It is this way of life that the terrorists have targeted.  
 
The Forum’s summits have been important political and expert spaces for rationalizing the need for 
Euro-Mediterranean and international urban knowledge networks. The idea of the Alliance of European 
Cities Against Violent Extremism was first put forward at the Aarhus Summit. With the help of the 
Congress and given the recurrent attacks in European cities since 2015, Efus has expanded its 
membership and mobilized for bigger summits.8 The 2017 Nice Summit turned into a gathering of 
Euro-Mediterranean mayors, and the Alliance of European Cities Against Violent Extremism was 
finally formalized at the Barcelona Summit in November 2017. The first EU Mayors’ conference on 
                                                     
8 Currently Efus has 250 city members from 16 EU member states. 
  
 13 
terrorism in 2018 took place as a follow-up to the 2017 Nice Declaration and the EU Action Plan (EC, 
2018c). Not surprisingly, some of the main themes of the Forum’s activities, such as increased power to 
urban authorities, spatially targeted intervention, security by design, and a focus on the ‘breeding 
grounds’ of radicalization, were central to the EU Mayors’ conference (EC & CR, 2018).  
 
With its political commitment to “de-centralizing” policymaking (Efus, 2017, pp. 23–7), the Forum’s 
policy activism around radicalization prevention strategies has brought new dimensions to the 
neoliberal re-scaling of state security in Europe and in the process has severely decreased possibilities of 
democratic participation. In tune with the broader neoliberal politics of the NGOs, Efus prides itself as 
an “independent network”, “a private, not-for-profit association operating a public service function” 
(Efus, 2017, p. 18). Yet, according to its own experts, “it has largely been a public-sector grouping led 
by mayors and local authorities,” with most of its meetings taking place behind closed doors.9 This 
politics of secrecy extends to the Forum’s publications and events on its EU-funded projects, the 
majority of which are only available to its members, essentially municipalities and other expert 
organizations working on crime and radicalization. Rather than democratizing policymaking, the 
Forum’s celebration of “decentralizing” policymaking has provided momentum for more exclusive and 
private urban and security knowledge-production networks, without any public accountability. In 
September 2017, the European Urban Knowledge Network and the European exchange learning 
programme, URBACT, which works on sustainable integrated development also joined policy forces to 
identify good practices for radicalization prevention (EUKN, 2017). One of the major common themes of 
both the Nice Summit (2017) and the EU Mayors’ conference was the importance of the private sector 
in prevention policymaking. In his opening remarks to the EU Mayors’ conference, Sir Julian King, 
Commissioner for the EU Security Union, highlighted the role of the private sector in helping cities to 
“fundamentally rethink our public spaces” and “to squeeze the space in which terrorists can operate”.10 
 
A closer look at the formation of Efus directs us to an interesting lineage: French urban policy. The 
Forum originated in the 1980s in the context of heightened urban unrest in the French banlieues and the 
gradual hegemony of urban neoliberalization with its focus on urban regeneration, gentrification, and 
the ‘war on crime’. Its founder and longest-serving president, Gilbert Bonnemaison (1930–2008), is a 
familiar name to the students of urban policy, politics, and policing in France. A former mayor of 
Epinay-sur-Seine (1967–1995) and socialist deputy for Seine-Saint-Denis (1981–1993), Bonnemaison 
was appointed chair of the Mayors’ Commission on Security, which was set up in 1982 by then-Prime 
Minister Pierre Mauroy to find a solution to the unrest in French banlieues. This was in the aftermath of 
                                                     
9 See https://efus.eu/files/2017/11/Crawford-Adam.pdf.  
10 See https://audiovisual.ec.europa.eu/en/video/I-151803. 
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a series of intense uprising of the banlieues from Lyon to Paris, which came to be known as the ‘hot 
summer of 1981’. The events not only intensified the rising political fear of the ‘ungovernability’ of 
banlieues, but also changed the colour of such fear by giving it a neocolonial shade in associating such 
assumed ungovernability with migration from former French colonies (Rey, 1999; Dikeç, 2007). Since 
then the French state’s (failed) solution to the unrest of the excluded residents of banlieues has been 
urban policy – a mixture of spatially targeted urban renovation and policing projects in poor areas of 
banlieues (see Dikeç, 2007). 
 
Bonnemaison’s 1982 report, Confronting Delinquency: Prevention, Repression and Solidarity, became one of 
the three founding texts of French urban policy targeting the banlieues (Bonnemaison, 1982; Dikeç, 
2007, pp. 48–56). Anchored in the nexus of security and development, Bonnesmaison advocated for a 
‘comprehensive approach’ to the causes of insecurity based on prevention (alongside repressive policing) 
and area-based development in those neighbourhoods (also see de Maillard, 2004). His report became an 
influential part of a hegemonic environmentally deterministic discourse – with roots in the nineteen-
century French reform movement (Rabinow, 1989) and the Chicago School of Urban Sociology 
(Thrasher, 1927), one that conceives of urbanism both as the cause of and the solution to insecurity in 
cities. The ‘Bonnemaison principles’ of social prevention through reforming ‘problem’ populations and 
neighbourhoods also have roots in the use of urbanism in French colonial pacification in North Africa 
(Çelik, 1997; Saberi, 2017) and are central to the Forum’s approach to preventing crime, building peace 
and now preventing radicalization (see Efus, 2017, pp. 14–6). 
 
By 1986, Bonnemaison’s principles of social prevention had made their way to the in-formation 
corridors of the European institutions through collaboration between the French National Council for 
the Prevention of Delinquency (at which time Bonnemaison acted as chair), the Council of Europe, and 
the Standing Conference of Local and Regional Authorities of Europe (now The Congress). Tellingly, 
Efus was officially constituted in 1987 with Bonnemaison as its president (1987–1996) at the Council of 
Europe’s conference on the European Campaign for Urban Renaissance in Barcelona (Efus, 2017, pp. 
16–7), which itself was part of the emerging discursive legitimation of gentrification and 
neoliberalization. From the early 1990s onwards, Efus also facilitated the establishment of national 
forums, with the French and Belgium Forums being established in 1992 and 1995 respectively in the 
aftermath of urban unrest in the French banlieues and Brussels’s poor quartiers. Later in the 2000s, Efus 
also extended its activities to the war on gangs and peacebuilding in Central America (Efus, 2012) and 




The Forum’s attempt to bring the urban question to the forefront of radicalization prevention debates 
has already made its way into urban policy formation. The latest urban policymaking in the Communes 
of Schaerbeek and Molenbeek-Saint-Jean in Brussels are telling examples.11 Schaerbeek and Molenbeek, 
respectively situated in the northwest and west of Brussels’s centre, have long been part of “the poor 
crescent” of the EU capital, the products of decades of urban neoliberalization, poor urban governance, 
gentrification of Brussels centre and its European quartiers, and systemic racism (Van Hamme et al., 
2016). Both Communes are known for their Otherized, ‘Muslim’ populations; Molenbeek is known for 
its high concentration of residents of Moroccan descent, while Schaerbeek is known for residents of 
Turkish and Moroccan descent. Schaerbeek and Molenbeek came into the spotlight of radicalization 
hysteria as ‘breeding grounds’ of radicalization on account of their association with Belgians leaving for 
Syria and the alleged ‘safe houses’ for the Paris and Brussels attacks. Since early 2017, both Communes 
have been partners in the Efus EU-funded projects: Schaerbeek is part of PRACTICES and participated 
in the Nice Summit in September 2017; Molenbeek is part of Local Voices project and also participated 
in PRACTICES conferences.  
 
Since 2015, the Molenbeek municipality and the Police Bruxelles-Ouest have implemented Service de 
Prévention. In its policy orientation for 2016 to 2018, the municipality situates “fighting against 
radicalism”, “urbanism”, and “revitalisation of our neighbourhoods” in relation to each other so as to 
make a “secure city” (Molenbeek-Saint-Jean, 2016, p. 1). Referring to “the tragic events of November 
2015 in Paris”, the municipality promises “to convey an image of Molenbeek-Saint-Jean” that 
corresponds to “a dynamic and attractive town where security, conviviality and a rich diversity 
dominate” (Molenbeek-Saint-Jean, 2016, p. 12). To achieve this promise, the municipality has installed 
new networks of surveillance cameras and Local Prevent Partnerships (PLP) in targeted areas as part of 
its preventive strategies for crime and radicalization (Molenbeek-Saint-Jean). There is a considerable 
geographical overlap between the PLP areas and the priority zones of urban renewal (zone de 
revitalisation urbaine – ZUR) in Molenbeek’s latest urban policy for 2017-2020 (Molenbeek-Saint-Jean, 
2017, pp.12-4). ZURs are characterized by concentrated non-White poverty, over-crowded, (relatively) 
cheap or social housing, high youth unemployment and foreign residents. In Molenbeek, these areas 
mostly include in and around quartier Maritime, la zone du canal, quartier Heyvaert, and Gare de l’Ouest.  
 
The Schaerbeek municipality and the Police Bruxelles-Nord have also implemented their strategy, 
Programme de Prévention Urbaine (PPU) since 2015. The PPU is based on “a repressive but also socio-
preventive approach” (Schaerbeek, 2017a, p. 1) as well as on an “integrated” and “holistic” one 
                                                     
11 The Communes of Schaerbeek and Molenbeek are among the 19 municipalities that have come together under 
the Brussel Capital Region, what is commonly referred to as Brussels.  
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(Schaerbeek, 2017, p. 2). A new governmental entity, the Local Integrated Security Cell (La Cellule de 
Sécurité Intégrée Locale) (CSIL), which is specifically tasked with bringing the police and municipal forces 
together, administers the PPU. The PPU has been involved with any project that directly or indirectly 
relates to radicalization prevention in Schaerbeek and has facilitated the collaboration between the 
municipality and Efus since 2016. Schaerbeek’s latest area-based urban policy for 2017-2020 is crafted 
with the direct participation of the PPU, in particular in designating ZURs (Schaerbeek, 2017b, p. 4). 
Here too there is a high overlap between the targeted geographies of the PPU intervention and the 
designated ZURs in Schaerbeek mostly situated in and around la place de Colignon, quartier Brabant, 
quartier Halmet, and Rue Royale Sainte-Marie. 
 
The convergences of radicalization prevention and urban policy in Schaerbeek and Molenbeek deserve 
their own detailed examination that is beyond the scope of this paper. However, taken together, these 
developments direct us to the gradual incorporation of radicalization prevention into processes of urban 
governance. This incorporation is neither innocent nor neutral. As mentioned earlier, the ideological 
appeal here is that symptoms of urban uneven development, racialization, segregation, and 
marginalization are turned into causes of radicalization. Thus the focus on the urban question has also 
included a legitimizing of the targeting of poverty, the ‘immigrant’/‘Muslim’ and their everyday spaces 
as threats to peace and security. In all its EU-funded work on terrorism and radicalization, Efus has 
explicitly focused on the threat of the ‘immigrant’/‘Muslim’, living in ‘ghettos’, from its first project on 
cities and terrorism which focused on the Pakistani community in the UK (Efus, 2007, pp. 56–8; 74–85) 
to its recent initiatives such as PRACTICES or LIAISE II. Mangus Ranstorp, a major figure of LIAISE 
II and the Quality Manager of RAN, has been one of the counterterrorism experts forcefully 
rationalizing the targeting of ‘immigrant neighbourhoods’ with their “garage mosques” as the “pressure 
cookers of discontent” and radicalization (see Ranstorp, 2015, 2010). It was not accidental that the first 
Efus-led European mayors’ summit took place in Aarhus in 2015; Aarhus, a city with a population of less 
than 250,000, had already been applauded for its radicalization prevention strategies explicitly targeting 
‘the Muslim’ problem (see Anderson & Moe, 2015).  
 
The targeting of ‘the Muslim’, as mentioned above, is a core ideology of radicalization prevention. What 
is specific to the Efus discourse is a seemingly scientific narrative that brings together the targeting of 
‘the immigrant’/‘Muslim’, area-based urban intervention, and development-oriented strategies. Its 
ideological tenets are the outcome of a linking of the geopolitics of the War on Terror, an 
environmentally deterministic, neocolonial urbanist ideology that perceives the urban form of the 
geographical concentration of non-White poverty as a bastion of threat and danger, and a liberal 
humanitarian ideology which advocates for civilizing the Other as the most sustainable way of 
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constructing liberal subjects. This ideological ensemble needs to be understood in relation to the 
historical production of ‘ungovernability’ in European cities, one that mediates and is mediated by urban 
and geopolitical imaginaries of danger and war.  
 
THE URBAN GEOPOLITICS OF TARGETING THE ‘BREEDING GROUNDS’ 
 
In his introductory remarks to a series of policy recommendations to the EU, Herman van Rompuy 
(2017, p. 7), the president of the European Policy Centre, declared “Member States need to invest in 
education, housing, job opportunities and the like to foster the integration of Muslim communities in 
urban banlieues” (p. 7). The name “urban banlieues” is a tautology in terms, given banlieue (literally, 
suburb) is essentially a product of urbanization. Its redundancy, however, directs us to the “mediating 
and organizing relations of ruling” (Bannerji, 2000), including the ideologies and representations of 
space, that make the term sensible to policymakers. Since the 1980s, the term banlieue, as with quartier or 
inner-city, denote more than suburb, district or neighbourhood; they denote a social space characterized 
by urban deprivation, non-White immigration, marginality, and disorder. Banlieue, in particular, has 
become the social space associated with the formerly colonized and the excluded in the Metropole 
(Dikeç, 2007; Silverstein, 2018). For the likes of van Rompuy, the term “urban banlieue” makes sense 
precisely because they understand banlieue as not urban, at best less urban, where urban itself denotes 
the ‘civilized way of life’, the ‘European way of life’, as Jean-Claud Frécon (2015), the president of The 
Congress, reminded the attendees of the Aarhus Summit. “Urban banlieues” evokes an urban geopolitical 
imaginary of danger, that of the neocolonial Other so far and yet too close to the Metropole.  
 
Cartographies of political fear within and without the domestic space are central to rendering Others as 
threatening (Dalby, 1990, 2007). By turning geographical specificities of insecurity into common sense, 
geopolitical ideologies play a major role in making such mapping of fear sensible. While feeding on a 
ravaging anti-Muslim racism as the current literature has highlighted, the current targeting of ‘the 
Muslim’ is also in relation to the cartographies of geopolitical fear arising particularly since the mid 
twentieth century, building upon the earlier processes of racializing the internal enemy as ‘the 
immigrant’ in European cities (see Yilmaz, 2016; Lucassen, 2005). While this history goes back to at 
least the mid-nineteenth century (Lucassen, 2005), the contemporary recasting of ‘the immigrant’ as a 
security threat owes much of its legitimacy to the urban and geopolitical contexts in the aftermath of 
the collapse of modern European colonialism and the production of Europe’s domestic neocolonies – the 
‘immigrant neighbourhoods’. The loosening of direct colonial domination also accompanied the 
deliberate reconstitution of former imperial and colonial subjects as foreigners, while exploiting their 
devalued labour and confining their living spaces within urban peripheries of the Metropole. In the post-
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colonial era, European states have not only constantly changed citizenship and immigration laws, but 
have also taken on the task of rewriting their national histories by eliminating the fundamental role of 
migrant labour in building those imperial nations (Dixon, 1981; Lucassen, 2005; Thomas, 2006; 
Bhambra, 2017). During the same period, state urban and regional policies played an influential role in 
giving materiality to the neocolonies and new cartographies of danger in European cities. In linking 
urban politics to geopolitics in this conjuncture, Lefebvre (2009, p. 181) pointed to the ways that the 
state mobilized urban policy in order to sustain domination over the post-colonial ‘migrant’ by confining 
their lives to what he called the “internal colonies” of European cities, a process that has been central to 
the production of today’s ‘immigrant neighbourhoods’.  
 
The recasting of ‘the immigrant’ as ‘the Muslim’ is traceable to the geopolitical struggles and ideologies 
in the late twentieth century. With the collapse of the Communist bloc and in the context of imperialist 
interventions and geopolitical struggles in the Middle East in the 1980s and 1990s,12 liberal and 
conservative forces in Europe (and the West) targeted political Islam as a threat to Western liberal 
democracy and its new imperialism (Mamdani, 2004). It is this historical production of neocolonies as 
peripheralized urban spaces in European cities that makes sensible the phrase “Muslims communities in 
urban banlieues” and the recasting of ‘immigrant neighbourhoods’ as the ‘breeding grounds’ of 
radicalization. And it is this relational historical production of ‘breeding grounds’, ‘immigrant 
neighbourhoods’, and state intervention that has yet to be scrutinized in the critical debates on 
radicalization prevention. Urban geopolitics (as an ideological ensemble) has played an important role in 
dehistoricizing this historical production.  
 
On the global level, the shattering of modern European colonialism brought shifts in imperialist and 
colonial relations of ruling. Globalization, neoliberalization, re-territorialization, and the multiplication 
of regional proxy wars in the Global South became imperialist strategies of neocolonial domination. The 
consequences of these interventions, including extreme uneven development, deepening poverty, forced 
migration, and capitalist dependence on migrant labour for expansion have, in turn, been increasingly 
occluded by new concerns for security. Already by the 1990s, the discourse of human security in 
international relations explicitly identified migration – particularly migration from the Global South to 
the Global North – as a security issue for/in the West (Duffield, 2001, 2007). The concept of the ‘failed 
state’ as the ‘breeding ground’ for harbouring terrorism first came into the lexicon of international 
politics at this conjuncture (Call, 2008), when the nexus of security and development became an integral 
part of the liberal way of war. From Robert Kaplan (1994) and Gerald Helman and Steven Ranter (1999) 
                                                     
12 This is the period after the 1979 Iranian revolution, during which we were witnessed to the first Palestinian 
Intifada in 1987, the Rushdie Affair in 1989, and the first Gulf War in 1991.  
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to Thomas Barnett (2004), imperialist geopoliticians were quick to re-imagine underdevelopment and 
the ravages of neocolonial imperialism in former colonies as danger. These geopolitical imaginaries 
provided political and intellectual backdrops for well-rehearsed neocolonial cartographies of ‘failed’ 
states, ‘ungoverned spaces’ of violence, ‘gaps’ in global economy, and ‘hotbeds’ of anarchy, thus paving 
the way for humanitarian wars and later the War on Terror (see Duffield, 2001; Dalby, 2007; Elden, 
2009). By 2006, the concept of ‘failed’ states significantly “shaped the way development, diplomatic and 
defence agencies viewed the nature of their enterprise and indeed how they viewed the world” (Call, 
2008, p. 4). 
 
We can detect parallel cartographies of danger and geopolitical fear, anchored in the nexus of security 
and development on the urban level during the same period. European cities have also been hit hard by 
uneven development, increasing socio-economic polarization, racial and spatial segregation, migratory 
movements, and the geographical concentration of poverty and wealth in and across cities (Porter & 
Craig, 2004; Brenner, 2004). This is the immediate context of the consolidation of ‘immigrant 
neighbourhoods’ and their territorial stigmatization (Wacquant, 2008) as ‘no-go zones’ of deviance and 
disorder. What has been dehistoricized in such ideological cartographies of danger is the fact that 
‘immigrant neighbourhoods’ are the products of neoliberal state restructuring, urban uneven 
development, structural racism, colonial and imperial legacies of Othering, and area-based urban policies 
of social mixity and policing (Bridge, 1981; Dikeç, 2007, 2017; Kundnani, 2007; Flint & Robinson, 2008). 
Since the mid-2000s, the situation in ‘immigrant neighbourhoods’, whether inner city or suburban, had 
already become a theme in the mainstream academic debates on radicalization “in connection with the 
riots, torching of cars and incidents of stone-throwing against emergency services vehicles that have 
been witnessed around Europe” (Hörnqvist & Flyghed, 2012, p. 328; see Fukuyama, 2006; Fraihi, 2008; 
Marret, 2010; Anderson & Moe, 2015; Varvelli, 2016)).  
 
The assumedly scientific indicators that these academics use to redraw urban cartographies of the 
‘breeding grounds’ of radicalization in European cities explicitly echoes the Failed States Index (now 
called the Fragile States index) proposed by the Fund for Peace in Foreign Policy magazine in 2005 (see 
Call, 2008, p. 1495), including high population density, poverty, political exclusion, crime, gangs, and 
racial/ethnic tensions. To this frenzy of expert knowledge, one also needs to add the gurus of Western 
counterinsurgency doctrine in the War on Terror. For David Kilcullen (2013) and John Nagl (2014), the 
consequences of rapid worldwide urbanization necessitates conducting counterinsurgency in the 
peripheralized urban spaces of metropolitan centres. For these military strategists of the War on 
Terror, future insurgencies will more and more spring from the slums of the Global South and the 
banlieues of the Global North rather than the mountains of Afghanistan. The military, they tell us, 
  
 20 
should move to urban counterinsurgency and appropriate lessons from the fields of community policing 
through to community development and urban planning.  
 
This territorialized and racialized representation of the ‘breeding grounds’ of radicalization in European 
cities also has echoes in the latest policy debates at the EU level. In his opening remarks to the 2018 EU 
Mayors’ conference, Karl-Heinz Lambertz, president of the Committee of the Regions, underlined the 
urgency of “multi-agency responses” to “the potential threats … which emerge from neighbourhoods in 
our cities … defined by social exclusion, unemployment, and low level of school attendance”.13 One 
comes across explicit namings such as “closed communities”, “no-go zones”, “ghettos”, and 
“disadvantaged neighbourhoods” in the EU parliamentary policy debates (PACE, 2015, pp. 3–5, 2016a, 
pp. 1–4; 2016b, pp. 1–3) and those of The Congress (2016a, p. 9). PACE has directly called for the use of 
urban policy to “invest in improving disadvantaged neighbourhoods and their social infrastructure” 
(2016b, p. 3). Importantly, the latter forms of naming and policy recommendations come from the 
closest EU allies of Efus. In her closing remarks to the 2018 EU Mayors’ conference, Corina Cretu, the 
EU Commissioner for Regional Policy, underlined “the importance of education, health care and urban 




On February 26, 2019, the European Commission (EC) and the Committee of Regions (CR) held the 
second EU Mayors’ conference, EU Cities Against Radicalization, behind closed doors in Brussels. 
“Urban security”, the conference communiqué reads, “goes beyond measures to protect citizens against 
terrorist attacks, requiring a holistic approach addressing radicalization at the earliest possible stage” 
(EU, 2019, p. 2). In their opening remarks, Lambertz, Avramopoulos, and King all emphasized the 
success of the 2018 conference and the need for such gatherings to design and share preventive 
responses and establish partnerships.15 Besides representative from RAN and Efus, who were also 
present at the 2018 conference, this time representatives from Nordic Safe Cities, Strong Cities 
Network, and EU-funded Efus initiatives such as PRACTICES, PREPARE, and BRIDGE were also 
among the 150 attendees. The EU Commission allocated another immediate €115 million from the 
Internal Security Fund – Police for projects on radicalization prevention in 2019–2020 and another €25 
million for the period of 2020–2024. 
 
                                                     
13 See https://audiovisual.ec.europa.eu/en/video/I-151803. 
14 See https://audiovisual.ec.europa.eu/en/video/I-151803 
15 See https://audiovisual.ec.europa.eu/en/video/I-151803. 
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There are always complex chasms between such expert gatherings, policymaking, and policy 
implementations on the ground. As Jaminé and Fadil (2019) have shown in relation to youth social 
workers involved with deradcalization of returnees in Antwerp, Belgium, policy implementation “occurs 
through the constant interrogation of its objects, methods, and aims” (p. 170). Yet, the ideological 
dimension of a crisis, as the late Stuart Hall (1978) emphasized in Policing the Crisis (p. 219), is crucial in 
producing consent to “the interpretations and representations of social reality generated by those who 
control the mental, as well as the material, means of social reproduction” and “to the measures of control 
and containment which this version of social reality entails” (1978, p. 221). One of the aims of this paper 
was to direct attention to the increasingly organized multi-scalar political and expert forces behind 
making particular visions of reality by policymaking and some of the less scrutinized ways of their 
practices of articulation – categorizations, spatial designations, naming, and problematization.  
 
Engaging with the politics of naming and problematizing in recent policy discourses and the political 
forces behind them, I argued that the ideology of radicalization prevention is not simply another façade 
of national security policy gone too far in its practices of securitization. Rather, it is a continuation of the 
liberal way of war in European cities, one that has been long practiced in the ‘ungoverned spaces’ of the 
Global South. This extension of liberal war into European cities is also accompanied by an increasing 
focus on the urban geopolitics of danger, a danger that is the relational outcome of the ungovernability 
of the Other at the urban and international scales and that blurs the spaces of liberal peace and war. In 
particular, I engaged with the ideologies of ‘holistic approach’ and ‘breeding grounds’, showing, on the 
one hand, their lineage in the strategies and geographical imaginaries of warfare such as 
counterinsurgency and the concept of ‘failed’ states. On the other hand, I showed how they have 
mediated and are mediated by the entry of urban experts and authorities into radicalization prevention 
debates, in the process legitimizing the targeting of poverty, ‘the immigrant’/‘Muslim’, and their living 
spaces as threats to peace and security.  
 
I also engaged with the European Forum for Urban Security (Efus) as a major player in shaping the 
debates on the role cities in radicalization prevention and the 2018 EU Mayors’ conference. I showed 
the political work of urban experts in making sensible the ungovernability of deprived, majority non-
White neighbourhoods and in governing the liberal way of war in such neighbourhoods. The gradual 
expert authority of Efus and the increasing level of secrecy in its activities, I argued, should warn us 
about the undemocratic aspects and pitfalls of the privatization of policymaking in the name of peace. It 
is not accidental that Efus, with its history in French urban policy for banlieues, has become an important 
expert and political force in the current debates on radicalization prevention. The transplantation of 
‘ungovernability’ from the peripheralized geographies of the imperialist world order to ‘immigrant 
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neighbourhoods’ of European cities has not occurred in a void. Naming ‘immigrant neighbourhoods’ as 
‘breeding grounds’ was made sensible because urban policy, policing, and media discourses had already 
made these marginalized, racialized, and segregated neighbourhoods ‘ungovernable’ in relation to 
poverty, deviance, and disorder.  
 
What is erased and distorted in this ideological fixation with ‘immigrant neighbourhoods’ as ‘breeding 
grounds’ is that the visible social, racial, and morphological differences of these neighbourhoods with, 
indeed their segregation from, the ‘European’ city has been neither voluntary nor natural. Imperialist 
wars, uneven development, neoliberalization, and systemic racism along with economic crisis and the 
failed postwar urban visions have brought a real crisis of democracy, diversity, territorialisation, and 
security in European cities. If policymakers and politicians celebrate development-oriented approaches 
to radicalization prevention as a progressive step, neither in policy debates nor in policy solutions do 
they actually address, even mention, the real causes of the current crisis that is deepening in European 
cities. In fact, the real crisis has yet to be named.  
 
The discussion here points to the gradual incorporation of radicalization prevention into the processes 
of urban governance. This is troubling because the very same urban practices that resulted in the 
production of ‘immigrant neighbourhoods’ as ‘ungovernable’ are now being advocated for breaking up 
the physical and social fabric of these neighbourhoods in the name of ‘neutralizing the breeding 
grounds’. There is an urgent need for conducting in-depth and on-the-ground research on the ways 
urban policy and radicalization prevention converge in the specific context of different cities. The 
specificities of such convergence – including the force of the colonial, imperial and national legacies; the 
role of various social and political forces; and the effects of such convergences on the everyday lives of 
those who are targeted and those who live in targeted neighbourhoods – need to be examined in specific 
contexts. In the time of unending wars, economic crisis, the electoral return of the hard-Right, and the 
recurrent urban uprisings of the excluded, what will be the consequences of the convergence of urban 
and war strategies in the name of safeguarding peace for democracy, social justice, and the right to 
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